This article describes and analyses voter alignments in the new democracy of Ghana in two recent elections, 1996 and 2000. These elections are a part of the Fourth Republic that began with a ' founding ' election in 1992, ushering Ghana into Africa's new wave of democratisation. First the size of the core voting population is established to be about 82 % of the voting population, refuting the assumption that voting volatility in new and transitional democracies is always extremely high. A second conclusion is that core and swing voters cannot be distinguished by structural factors, whereas thirdly, the factors behind the party alignment of core voters are similar to Western patterns ; primarily level of education, the rural-urban divide, income, and occupation. Finally, swing voters seem to be characterised by a conscious evaluation of government and candidate performance in a sign of relatively ' mature ' democratic voting behaviour.
whereas only about 18% are swing voters whose allegiance is liable to switch between elections. This is in itself an important conclusion, since it is often assumed that voting volatility in new and transitional democracies is very high. A second conclusion is that the core and swing voters cannot be distinguished by structural criteria. It is not, for example, that urban or highly educated individuals tend to be 'swingers' to a larger extent. Thirdly, however, the two-party alignment of core voters can be understood to a large extent in terms of structural factors, primarily level of education, the rural-urban divide, income, and occupation. Fourthly, the swing voters' choice of party defies such classification, and seems to depend more on the candidates' performance and on issues, signifying an evaluative and relatively 'mature ' voting behaviour. While our sample does not allow for wide-ranging generalisations, it is a first step in the production of data that will allow the generation of stronger hypotheses in future research about voter alignments in new African democracies. The article starts by outlining the electoral context of the case studied, Ghana; it then describes the sample and how the data were generated, followed by the empirical analysis of the four issues identified, and a conclusion.
G H A N A
The Gold Coast, as it was then called, held a number of competitive elections in the period leading up to decolonisation. A class of local aspirants, voluntary associations and leaders emerged early in the colony (Hodgkin 1956; Young 1994) , and by 1948 local interests had coalesced around several skilled and charismatic leaders (Apter 1963) , forming a consensus for political independence (Austin 1964) . The British oversaw a series of electoral contests, in which the young Kwame Nkrumah became Head of Government Business in 1951, maintaining this position in 1954 with his Convention People's Party (CPP) winning 55% of the parliamentary seats. The main opposition party, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), representing the local merchant, business and professional class, came together around its own contenders for leadership of the post-colonial state, J. B. Danquah and later Kofi Busia. By 1956, clear partisan lines had developed, known as the Nkrumah and Danquah-Busia axes: the one populist and state-interventionist ; and the other liberal-mercantilist with its own tinge of interventionism (Morrison 2004) .
In a pattern typical among African states, Nkrumah and his CPP soon after independence became frustrated with the rigours of democratic repartee. Ghana's first republic was declared in a plebiscite in 1960, when Nkrumah abandoned the Westminster tradition in favour of a strong presidency. De jure and de facto one-party states were initiated by leaders not only in Ghana at this time but in many other African states. Nkrumah's single-party dominant regime in Ghana remained in place until the first coup d'état in 1966.
2 A 1969 election returned a civilian government led by Kofi Busia, whose perennial UGCC-based opposition now ran as the Progress Party (PP), in a race in which competition was seriously depressed by the official banning of the CPP and any identifiable remnants. The PP subsequently met the same fate as most elected regimes in African states during this period, when it was ousted in another military coup in 1972. Alternation between the two partisan axes occurred again when Hilla Limann's Nkrumaist Peoples National Party (PNP) gained power in the Third Republic (1979-81) . On 31 December 1981, Flt. Lt. Jerry J. Rawlings disposed of the elected Limann government in another coup d'état, and the leftist People's National Defence Council (PNDC) under Chairman Rawlings ruled for eleven years.
The Fourth Republic
The present regime emerged in the early 1990s, a period when almost all of the 47 sub-Saharan African countries liberalised their political regimes (Bratton & van de Walle 1997) , and 44 of them conducted multiparty elections during the following decade (Lindberg forthcoming) . Under the new constitution effective from 1992 that permitted political parties to function, the PNDC assumed a civilian posture as the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and successfully contested the presidency. It did so with a clever reworking of many Nkrumaist themes while rendering itself as a kind of ' third force ' element. Ghana's fourth republic has so far done relatively well, surviving through four election cycles, of which the most recent was successfully concluded in December 2004 , and also witnessed a peaceful alternation in power between civilian governments for the first time in the country's history with the general election of 2000.
Ghana's political history is thus in many ways similar to general developments in Africa since independence, while the present electoral regime presents a series of successive polls, allowing for data generation on voting behaviour under relatively ' normal' civilian and democratic conditions, not intersected by civil wars, coups, authoritarian rule and the like. In other words, it presents us with an opportunity to get a sense of how voter alignments may look under democracy in an African country. We are not claiming that Ghana and the voters we have sampled represent the continent as a whole, only that this is an example that can give us some empirically based working hypotheses for future research on both Ghana and other African nations. Voting alignments, behaviour and rationales are under-researched areas in current African politics, lacking basic data with which to work in formulating stronger hypotheses to be tested in future research. The basic data in this study contribute to the endeavour to open these areas to better empirical analysis.
T H E S A M P L E Our results are based on a pilot survey of Ghanaian voters carried out over approximately eight weeks between June and August 2003. Our strategy was to render the most representative and random sample practicable within the limits of available resources for such a study, and given that the multifaceted context of African societies often requires standard social scientific sampling methods to be slightly adjusted. When one cannot include all cases of a population, or draw a statistically representative sample by randomised procedures, the standard methodology is to make a decision on the basis of an informed selection of cases that ensures the fullest possible variation (cf. King et al. 1994; Munck 1998) . Our sample was drawn from six constituencies in four regions -Central, Ashanti, Volta and Greater Accra. The selection of the constituencies was designed to tap the most important regional variations in election outcomes reflecting political realities. We first chose one 'safe haven' constituency from each of the regions where the two major parties are dominant: Ho West controlled by the NDC in its home base the Volta Region ; and Kwabre controlled by the NPP where it is consistently strongest in the Ashanti Region.
3 By doing this we picked the two extremes on the scale of party domination in Ghanaian politics. Besides being safe havens, each of these two constituencies also allowed for a wide selection of citizens : towns, rural areas, trading markets, production sites and educational institutions, as well as poorer farming districts.
Second, we selected two 'contested ' constituencies where competition between the parties has been intense. Supplementing the first two constituencies, these contested areas are at an opposite extreme on the axis of political competition. By choosing two constituencies in the same region (Central) that were as similar as possible, we could hold a number of factors more or less constant: the Effutu constituency was won by the NDC in 1992, narrowly held in 1996 and 2000, then lost to the NPP in 2004 by a small margin; in the Cape Coast Central constituency, the NPP prevailed in the last three elections, but the contests were sharply fought.
Both stretch inland from the coastline, with similar populations: fishing, farming, trading, and merchandising communities. They are also similar in ethnic variation and mixture of urban and rural settings.
Finally, we sampled the capital metropolitan area (Greater Accra), which hosts approximately 2 . 9 million people (about 16% of the population). We selected two constituencies, again among the most competitive in the area, Ablekumah South and Kpone-Katamanso. Ablekumah South is the constituency with the highest number of inhabitants in Ghana, ranging from suburban fishing peoples to urban city dwellers and office workers, but is generally a poor district. It has been won by the NPP over the last three elections in highly competitive contests. Kpone-Katamanso is semi-rural for the most part, and situated on the outskirts of the capital area with a mixture of commuters to the city and country-side workers. The NDC won this seat in all three elections but had to fight hard to win.
The northern part of the country was not included, due to lack of resources and problems of accessibility during the summer rainy season. This area bordering Burkina Faso now forms three regions : the Upper East, Upper West and Northern regions. This part of the country has a higher percentage of Muslims than the rest of Ghana, and is generally less developed than the southern part, although considerable variation exists within all the regions of the country. While it would have been preferable to include voters from this area too, after a careful assessment of our data we do not believe that would have changed our results. An indication of whether this mattered may be gained by comparing electoral outcomes in the northern regions with those that we sampled, even though our survey provides data on individual voters' alignment over a series of elections, which is different from assessing overall results : two voters swapping party but in opposite directions would indicate no change in the overall result, but would provide evidence of volatility in our data. It also differs from looking at core and swing constituencies in terms of parliamentary seats, since a number of voters may change their votes without affecting which party wins the seat. Choosing between these two alternative methods of assessment, we find that vote counts and shares provide the most stringent test of our data, because these are based on the same individual level unit of analysis, rather than the aggregated seat share that is also influenced by the electoral system. We therefore turned to official election results to provide some information on the consequences of excluding the northern part of the country. If the north was very different from our sample regions in terms of voting alignment and behaviour -the dependent variable of our study -it would show also in the election statistics (and it is only significant deviations on the dependent variable that introduce bias, cf. King et al. 1994 ; Munck 1998) . Table 1 presents the official election data disaggregated by the regions we sampled, compared to the northern regions and others. With regard to electoral volatility over the two elections we analyse in this article, the northern three regions in Ghana do not stand out by comparison with the rest of the country. The total average electoral volatility for the three northern regions is 15 . 5% -slightly higher than the Greater Accra region but significantly lower than Volta region, while the Ashanti region stands out with an aggregate volatility of only about 9%. All in all, there is little to suggest from these figures that voter alignments and the relationship between core and swing voters would be significantly different in the excluded northern part of the country.
The population of the three northern regions combined is only about 18% of the national total, while Ashanti and Accra have 17% and 16% respectively. Nor, therefore, do the northern regions carry a large number of parliamentary seats. In sum, excluding the northern part of the country does not seem likely to have introduced a serious bias in our measurement of the dependent variable. Within each constituency, we selected six to sixteen town areas, villages and communities with the help of our local research assistants to ensure a representative cross-section of the population in the constituency: geographical spread, variation in employment (from fishing and farming to merchants, public servants and chiefs), levels of education, urbanisation, income and political alignments. This second tier of informed selection -within the constituency -is because the population in both rural and urban areas tends to be highly clustered, increasing the risk that a random selection of a smaller number of respondents renders a skewed sample. In each selected area, we started at the eastern end and worked our way towards the west, approaching every fourth house or building if possible. This standard household survey methodology risks introducing a number of biases in the sample, however. Women are less likely to be the respondents in a household (or absent due to trading); the employed tend to be at their offices or farms a good part of the day ; and younger people tend to congregate outside. In short, older and uneducated or unemployed voters risk being over-sampled. Therefore, we also specifically targeted women at market places, young people at local meeting spots, and public and private employees at their workplaces, in an effort to attain fair representation.
With the help of local guides we also adjusted our schedule to target villages on their non-farming days to connect with farmers.
4 Using oral interviews (in English or a local language), the researchers and assistants completed the survey questionnaires, soliciting answers to both pre-coded categorical variables and qualitative comments. Before sampling, the three research assistants were trained in the use of the survey instrument and each worked in pair with one of the authors during their first day in the field in order to ensure equivalence in the use of coding criteria. The data was subsequently entered by the researchers and all processing was done in SPSS 10 . 0.
National voting behaviour and the sample
The two-party dominant partisan alignment of the Ghanaian political environment is evident in the elections from 1992 to 2004. The first presidential poll in 1992 was split between the NDC (58%), and the others (42%). Most of the losing vote went to the Danquah-Busia legatee, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which refused to accept the outcome and withdrew from the subsequent first parliamentary contest (Morrison 1999) . 5 The following three elections in 1996, 2000, and 2004 are the most satisfactory in the country's history, widely seen as ' free and fair ' by both partisan competitors and an array of international observers. While there were routine charges about the 'incumbency' advantage enjoyed by the ruling NDC government in 1996 and 2000, as well as by the NPP in the 2004 election, there were no disputes of such severity that the contesting parties challenged the overall outcomes.
The party that won the presidency also gained a majority in each parliamentary contest, but the competitiveness of the legislative body has intensified. In 1996, the opposition NPP controlled only slightly more than 30% of the seats, while in 2000 the opposition NDC controlled 46% of the seats. After the elections in 2004, when the number of seats was increased from 200 to 230, the NDC lost a relative share of the seats (down to 41%), but gained almost the same total number of seats (94, against after the 2000 elections).
As shown in Table 2 , the sample of 690 voters interviewed in this project shows a close correspondence in terms of voting shares with the actual national outcomes in both the 1996 and 2000 elections, and the overall outcome in 2004 almost mirrors the results from 2000. In 1996, the NDC took 57 . 3% of the parliamentary votes, while the NPP collected 39 . 7%. Our survey sample of voters shows a very close resemblance to these outcomes, registering a voting share of 58 . 0% for the NDC and 39 . 6% for the NPP among our respondents.
In 2000, when the ruling NDC president and former PNDC chairman Jerry J. Rawlings was unable to succeed himself in power, the NPP came to power in an even more tightly fought contest, taking 45% of the parliamentary vote against 41% for NDC candidates. Our sample of voters again matched these results to a satisfactory extent, although the statistics show a discrepancy compared with the results for the small parties, probably largely due to the small N. Overall, it should therefore be reasonable to assume that this sample does not differ too much in terms of being politically representative from the Ghanaian electorate as a whole. The following analysis focuses mainly on the 1996 and 2000 elections for specific reasons. We have excluded the first election in 1992 because the parliamentary poll was boycotted by the main opposition party NPP, while our survey preceded the 2004 election. Source : Electoral Commission of Ghana, and our own survey.
V O T E R A L I G N M E N T S I N G H A N A
In order to address issues of voter alignment, we need first to distinguish core from swing voters. The reasoning about voter alignments builds on a premise of low voter volatility (that most individual voters support the same party over a series of elections), not that a party collects roughly the same share of votes, which is still possible with high voter volatility. Whether based on rational choice (e.g. Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981) , sociopsychological characteristics (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960) , or structuralhistorical cleavages (e.g. Lipset & Rokkan 1967) , reproduction of voter alignments in a clear pattern combined with a certain amount of swing voting suggests that while a majority of the electorate may be identifiable by persisting factors (typically level of education, class, gender and age), the swingers are not. Table 3 presents the results of our analysis of Ghanaian voter volatility. We use respondents' answer to the question which party's parliamentary candidate they voted for in the 2000 election as a base line (rows), and compare this with the same individual's response to which party's candidate he or she voted for in 1996 (columns).
6 Thus, in the box in the lower-right corner marked with bold, we find respondents who reported that they voted for parties other than the NDC or the NPP in 2000 but also had done the same in 1996 (36 . 9% of the supporters of ' Others' in 2000) . Then, to the left of that box in the same row we find two boxes with respondents who voted for other parties in 2000 but had voted for either the NPP or the NDC in the 1996 election (10 . 5% and 52 . 6% of the supporters of ' Others' in 2000) . In other words, of the total electoral support the 'Others ' received in the 2000 election, only slightly more than one-third consisted of a core of loyal party supporters for these parties. Out of the 268 respondents who voted for NDC in the 2000 parliamentary election, 94 . 8% had voted for the same party in 1996 (figures in bold, box in the upper-left corner), and are thus classified as core voters, while the minor share of swing voters the party collected mainly came from the NPP. That the 2004 election results for NDC candidates were similar to the figures in 2000 also indicates that the party at present is indeed running on a core of loyal voters who supported it in 1996 and probably also in 1992.
The 2000 election was when the former opposition party, NPP, gained power and went from 67 parliamentary seats to 100 (out of 200), so that volatility was presumably higher than before. Official election results lead one to believe that the share of swing voters is about 13%, leaving somewhere between 85% and 90% of the electorate in the category of loyal party supporters. Nevertheless, in our survey we find that about 82% of the respondents consist of core voters who supported the same party in both elections, while 18% switched from one party to another. The difference is explained by our methodology, which makes it possible to trace each individual's voting behaviour over time, while official results cannot provide such information. As hinted before, this gap is to be expected, given that there will always be voters who cancel out each other's changing vote in official statistics, when some individuals change from party A to party B, while others change from party B to party A.
Yet the still relatively high share of loyal party supporters may be surprising to some observers, given the commonplace view that African parties and voters are fluid, and the theoretical assumption that it takes time for party systems, hence voters, in new democracies to mature and stabilise. In addition, this particular interval in Ghana represented a period of political change. On the other hand, swing voters at the rate of roughly 18% in what is essentially a two-party system, constitute a substantial share of the total. It is not surprising that a vast majority of the swing voters are found in the NPP camp in the 2000 election, since that was the party which seized power at this time. The old ruling party, NDC, on the other hand, seems to have been left with largely its core supporters. If this is a stable group of loyal supporters who are defined by structural features, these should be possible to identify. This also seems to suggest that the party is not likely to shrink further, but may have the potential to gain in strength in the next elections in 2008. As a matter of fact, our results indicate that the NDC actually has a majority of the firmly aligned and loyal voters. Out of the total core voters (N=485) in our sample, 52 . 4% (N=254) voiced allegiance to the NDC rather than any other party. That means that the NDC in terms of electoral support stands a better chance of winning, if it can capture as many of the swing voters as the NPP in the future.
The present electoral support of the ruling NPP on the other hand, consists of more than 26% swing voters who have proved in the past to be willing to change sides. Looking ahead, that certainly makes another alternation in power quite possible in the coming years. Yet the NPP also has a solid base of core voters, who both in terms of numbers (N=224) and in share of total core voters (46 . 2%), trail not far behind the NDC. This share of core NPP voters is substantial enough to begin to explore the assumption that a liberal-business connection to the party is creating an alignment of more educated and urbanised voters among its loyal supporters. Most volatile, not surprisingly, are voters who at some point vote for the smaller parties' candidates, whose share of core voters is in the range of one third of supporters in the 2000 election ; however, the numbers in this group are small, making any conclusions unreliable. Our results confirm the common sense reading of aggregate election results, showing that swing voters moved primarily from the NDC to the NPP in the 2000 election. Our sample of voters indicates that almost all (N=77, 25 . 2% of the party's total votes and 93 . 9% of total new votes) of new NPP supporters in the 2000 election were travelling from the former ruling NDC party. But some of the old NDC-supporters who changed their minds in 2000 also went to one of the other smaller parties.
Turning to the second issue, then, are the swing voters a particular breed who can be identified by structural features, different from loyal party supporters constituting the core of their support base? Table 3 showed that a vast majority of the swing voters went from NDC to the now ruling NPP in the 2000 parliamentary election. Was this exodus from the NDC's electoral shelter caused by a policy failure that hit particular groups such as traders or farmers, for example, or the urban population that usually is said to be adversely affected by structural adjustment programmes, the unemployed, high income earners, or a new cohort entering the voting age population? To address this second question, Table 4 presents an analysis of the relationship between core vs. swing voters, in terms of seven structural features typically thought to influence voting behaviour.
The results of this comparison are easy to interpret. There are simply no significant differences between core and swing voters on any of these structural dimensions indicating age, gender, education, class, social status, and sector and income. Individuals who decided to vote differently in 2000 than in 1996 are thus not identifiable by any structural criterion. One would want to know more about who the swing voters were : were they defying the structural characteristics, for example, because they came from a particular region or a selection of ethnic groups ? We cannot answer that question since almost all voters went from the NDC to NPP, and the numbers are too small to allow for that kind of comparison. But we do know something about their own perception of their rationale. One part of our survey included a question on why they voted as they did in the 2000 election. We have seen that almost all ' swingers' voted for the NPP in 2000, and of those 62 . 5% said they did so to ' throw the rascals out ' (using various formulations to make this point). This to us seems to suggest that these voters, independent of their socio-economic localisation, gender, education and age, evaluated government performance as relatively 'mature ' voters, and decided to punish a ruling party when they found they had been disappointed, and/or when the alternative seemed better. But it also strengthens our feeling that these voters may shift their electoral loyalty back again in the future should the tables turn.
In the following analysis, the two remaining arguments are pursued simultaneously : that core voters' choice of alignment with either of the two main parties in Ghana indeed tends to have identifiable features associated with structural factors such as education, gender and the urban-rural divide; and that swing voters in Ghana differ from core voters in that their voting behaviour in terms of party choice cannot be understood in terms of such structural factors.
Structural features of voter alignments in Ghana
Turning now to explore the third and fourth questions about party alignment of core voters in Ghana, and the peculiarities of swing voters, we note that the Danquah-Busia tradition in Ghanaian politics of which NPP is the current expression, has always been associated with liberal economic thinking and the business sector in society. The Nkrumaists preferred political mobilisation, populism and state intervention. The NDC leadership led by Jerry J. Rawlings seemed to reflect some of the sentiments of the Nkrumaists. He was socialist and pursued a rural strategy including heavy infrastructural developments during his almost 20 years in power. Is it quite right that the NDC reflects a populist, working class and agrarian party heavily dependent on a rural constituency? And is it correct that the NPP represents the elite sector of the society, most interested in protecting a free-market liberal state to advance private commercial interests ? Are voter alignments in Ghana structured along such ' Western' lines of division?
These structural and institutional factors for voter alignments have been reflected in the literature for a long while (e.g. Lipset & Rokkan 1967) . They not only locate individual voters on various socio-economic and demographic clusters, but also reflect how these structural phenomena may be intertwined with other measures associated with voting rationale. For example, it has been hypothesised that besides the obvious difference in modernisation implied by the rural-urban divide, this cleavage may also indicate different conceptions of power (Mamdani 1996: 18) , policy preferences (Bates 1981: 96ff ) , or even preferences for incumbents (Nugent 2001 : 423) . The data reveal that commonplace Western conclusions about overlapping structural features of voter alignment also apply to some extent in Ghana. The ability of the parties to compete for the support of marginal voters thus strengthens the role of ideas in the decision process for voters (Morrison 2004) , while with as many as 20% of voters liable to switch allegiance, party competitiveness is enhanced by the potential for shifts in government as happened in 2000. Table 5 shows the importance of demographic features for the party alignment of core and swing voters respectively. While the Table 5 , making it redundant. The anticipated division between the partisan sentiments of urban and rural voters shows the predicted pattern among core voters. Whereas a majority in urban areas voted for the NPP (64%), the NDC was ahead (60%) among rural and semi-rural voters, consistent with what is often thought to be the stronger NDC identification among rural voters, based on reasons to do with material, ideological and patronage factors (Bafoe-Arthur 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 1999a ; Ninsin 1998; Nugent 1995). The differences in voter alignment along the urban-rural divide are statistically highly significant, and thus seem to be a decisive factor in explaining the two-party arrangement in Ghana. Swing voters, on the other hand, cannot be distinguished accordingly. Whereas it is a matter of surprise that the NPP made such significant inroads in rural and semi-rural areas in the 2000 election, the party successfully strengthened its support there, clearly contributing to its electoral victory. But the NPP made equally significant gains among urban voters, and this strengthens the conclusion from Table 5 above that the urbanrural divide can not therefore explain what makes a swing voter in Ghana.
Nor do men and women differ in the weight of their party support among either core or swing voters. Whereas men are evenly distributed between NPP and NDC, more women tend to vote for NDC in the sample, but the differences are not significant. But women are less likely to be swing voters than men, which is also interesting. It is not a huge difference but noticeable, as women make 35% of the swing voters, whereas their share of core voters exceeds 40%.
There is a smaller disparity between the most youthful voters and more mature voters. Only among 18-24 years olds is one party significantly more successful, and looking back in the 1996 election the NDC support among the most youthful group doubled that for the NPP. But while there is a noticeable difference there, overall the age variable is neither a statistically significant factor in explaining stable voter alignments in Ghana, nor can it be used to identify swing voters of the two parties. Table 6 ascertains that education and to some extent class have predictable effects on voters. Most of the highly educated core voters identify with the NPP (63%), while a majority of those loyal party supporters with no schooling or only primary or secondary education voted for the NDC (55-58%), presumably reflecting its working and agrarian class base. The level of support declines so that a mere third of those with a post-secondary diploma or university training identify with the NDC. As education advances, in short, support for the NDC wanes, and vice versa with support for the NPP; and tests show that these changes have statistical significance, even for swing voters. Yet, as noted above, it is not that swing voters in Ghana have particularly low or high education, but mainly that among the least educated swing voters a disproportional share have shifted from voting NDC in favour of support for NPP. Occupation, thought to be correlated to both class and social status, as expected shows a relationship to voter alignments in the same direction as education. Those in higher class/status jobs are far more likely to support the NPP, while lower status occupations support the NDC. In this instance this included skilled labourers and those in business. While the NPP has always been associated with the business sector, and many of its leaders are also important industrial and service company owners, the survey predominantly registers small-scale, self-employed businesses like hairdressers, petty traders, shop owners and so on. Interestingly, however, the unemployed are far more likely to support the NPP. We may presume that this anomalous finding results because these respondents attribute their unemployment to acts of a sitting government, the NDC at the time. Equally interesting is that those who identified themselves as traditional leaders or politicians (a relatively small number in the sample) were overwhelming in their support for the NDC, sometimes thought hostile to interests of the chieftaincy. As for the other structural factors, nothing about swing voters seems to be related to occupational status, except perhaps being a politician and/or chief/queen mother, but the numbers do not allow such to be more than speculations.
In a further clarification of employment status, we separated out public and private sector employees, students and unemployed/retired persons. Among core voters, public sector employees supported the NPP by a wide margin (64%), while among private sector employees NDC had a stronger support (57%), perhaps a bit of a surprise given the private commercial interests thought to form a part of the NPP constituent base. Yet the vast majority of citizens in the private sector in a developing country like Ghana are the self-employed small-scale operators discussed above. More surprising was the fact that almost two-thirds of the public sector employees among core voters rally behind the NPP. The literature on neopatrimonial rule in Africa typically builds on the assumption that patronage is distributed in part as spoils through the public sector and the provision of jobs, which should induce public sector citizens to be more inclined to support the incumbent NDC government.
There are at least two possible explanations for this theoretical anomaly. The (then) PNDC regime vigorously implemented structural adjustment programmes in Ghana during the 1980s that greatly reduced the opportunities for neopatrimonial politics. While in many countries these programmes were not implemented with much faith, in Ghana they were more rigorously pursued than in many other places. But it is also the fact that the introduction of competitive electoral politics with increased transparency and public accountability has severely undercut the possibilities to sustain neopatrimonial rule. But patron-client relationships may also simply be undermined with the repetition of democratic elections. While vote-buying, for example, is a well-known feature of many new (and some older) democracies, it is notoriously hard to enforce such agreements. A secret ballot is a secret ballot, and as long as that fundamental right is ensured, vote-buying politicians have few possibilities to control whether the voter honours the bargain. During our fieldwork, we collected many such stories, especially from younger voters in Ghana who ' chopped' handouts from aspiring candidates, but then went to cast their vote as they themselves saw fit. In any case, public sector employees seem to be structurally inclined to support the NPP in Ghana.
Students, on the other hand, were supporters of the NDC, and overall the differences between the groups of core voters are highly statistically significant. But as we found with regard to many of the other factors discussed above, the public-private distinction seems to have little bearing on characterising swing voters. While slightly higher proportions of public sector employees seem to be inclined to switch towards the NDC, the differences are not significant. More importantly, although this is not displayed by the figures in the table, the shares of swing voters in each category do not differ from the distribution among core voters. It is not, for example, as if swing voters were disproportionately public sector employees. Rather, the distribution was more or less the same as for core voters, and explanations for being a swing voter, as well as for why swing voters voted for one or the other party, must be sought elsewhere.
Finally, income level is another indicator of living conditions, class and social status that in almost all established democracies has been shown to be causally related to voting alignments; the higher the income, the more likely the voter is to vote for a more liberal or rightwing party. This also seems to be true for new democracies in Africa such as Ghana. It is only in the lowest income strata, having no or extremely low cash income, that the more leftist-oriented NDC score a majority of votes, whereas the now new ruling party NPP with its roots in liberal economic thinking tallies higher especially among high-income citizens. This may make economic sense as a rational individual calculation, but is also a structural feature of voter alignments in Ghana, just as in old democracies.
:
: :
Using the first survey of its kind on voter alignments in Ghana, we found that core voters displaying stable voting patterns constitute approximately 80% of the voters, leaving a proportion of swing voters in the system sufficient to sustain a high level of competition and the prospect of repeated changes in government in the future -a hallmark of a functioning democracy. At the same time, the proportion of swing voters is not extremely high by any measure, thus defying assumptions of high voter volatility in new African democracies. Secondly, it seems beyond doubt that partisan citizens with cemented party preferences are not distinguishable from swing voters by structural criteria such as age, education or socio-economic status. What makes citizens in a place like Ghana become 'swingers' over a series of elections obviously has to do with other things. Thirdly, however, we found that the party alignments among the core voters can be explained to a significant degree by factors well known from the study of voters in established democracies: the urban-rural divide, level of education, occupation status and sector, and income levels. In the stable two-party system in Ghana, rural belongingness, low levels of education, farmer and working-class jobs, and low income signify a stable alignment with the leftist-oriented NDC, whereas the opposite plus being employed in the public sector is typical of voting for the contemporary expression of the liberal, more right wing tradition in Ghanaian politics, the NPP. Finally, swing voters base their vote on other factors, suggesting a rational evaluation of government and candidate performance.
The empirical question of partisan voter identification can hardly generate an exhaustive scientific answer. Notwithstanding problems of reliability, equally significant is that there has been virtually no long-term tracking of opinion about these fleeting matters. The Afro-Barometer that is beginning to systematically put together some relevant data only began its collection in 1999. The most reliable data must be culled from systematic study of voters taking part in elections, although we are yet missing the long time series we would like. But we have to make do with what data we can gather for now, and this is more revealing in Ghana than in many other places in Africa, pointing to a relatively stable two-party arrangement. In a 1999 survey of attitudes in Ghana, the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) found a high level of partisan identification, which was associated with the two main parties. Sixty-six per cent of the respondents identified with a political party ; 38% identified with the [then] ruling NDC and 25% with the opposition NPP, while according to that first Afrobarometer, no other political party secured the allegiance of more than 2% of the voting population (CDD 1999: 20 ; Bratton et al. 2005) .
As noted, Ghana has a fairly long tradition of civilian elections, and an equally long voter identification with two main parties. The electoral outcomes show this tendency consistently since the eve of independence.
However, this consistent pattern has been perhaps most evident in the Fourth Republic. During this time, not only have the two main parties dominated the electoral competition, but they have done so under the same leadership groups and organisational names. This may not seem a lot, but it must be recalled that no previous government lasted beyond its first republican election, and no party name (governing or opposition) survived the departure of the Republic under which it served. Despite the changes in organisation names, the nature of recruitment and the sociopolitical environment have nevertheless sustained identifiable coalitions and networks across elections and military coups. Perhaps the most important feature that sustains this way of life is structural. The early mobilisation in Ghana shaped a contest between two powerful groups, each of which was remarkably successful in raising a big tent to which other interests were aggregated. This proved to be a formula by which opportunities for success were largely controlled by these two groups. That has remained a means for contestation, where the political prize is sketched in such limited structural terms.
In short, whereas many area specialists have persisted in claiming Africa to be unique to the extent of defying general comparative politics theories and requiring contextual concepts and methods, this study shows that such a view has its limitations, and that much of what we know about how electoral and democratic politics works in the established democracies may also well apply to new democracies in Africa.
N O T E S 6. These two questions were part of a larger questionnaire, in which they were asked separately with about 20 other questions asked in between, so as to make the replies more independent of each other.
